【PART 2】 The Mystery of Fukushima: Why Japan Cannot Stop Nuclear Power Plants？
【18】 Elite Japanese officials and “behind-the-scenes” legal structure became integrated
In the Sunagawa Case, introduced in PART 1, the U.S. Ambassador sought to overturn the judicial ruling that the U.S. military base was unconstitutional. To accomplish this, he asked Japan to bypass the High Court in Tokyo and to appeal directly to the Supreme Court to reverse the ruling.
This “request” by the U.S. was passed through the secret “back door” authority channel: the U.S. Ambassador to Japan (D. McArthur Jr.)? ⇒ MOFA (Aiichiro Fujiyama)? ⇒ Japanese government (Nobusuke Kishi)? ⇒ Ministry of Justice (Kiichi Aichi) ? ⇒ the Supreme Court (Kotaro Tanaka).
The three secret instruction manuals that I mentioned earlier were written to position, or to make a pretense of positioning, such a use of power as policies within the legal structure under the Constitution.
No doubt anyone would be fed up with such matters at this point. Nonetheless, it’s important to bear with my detailed presentation of the situation: This use of power, exercised repeatedly on behalf of the U.S. bases, has even more dramatic consequences.
Officials of the MOFA and MOJ, who occupy central positions of power in the state, repeat such trespasses on the prerogatives of the judiciary. By doing so, they are revealing their authority to disrespect the “superficial” legal structure of the nation.
We cannot blame only them, however. In a sense, what they do is not surprising. Those elite bureaucrats understand that no matter how discussions by the general public, based on the “superficial” legal structure, begin to lead toward solutions, or how actual remedies seem to be advancing, these will end up being reversed according to the wishes of the U.S.
The situation is illustrated by the fact that the Hatoyama administration, which ignored the “behind-the-scenes” legal structure, lost its power in nine months, while the Noda administration, which followed bureaucrats’ orders, continued for one year and four months. Hatoyama had been overwhelmingly supported by the people, while no one thought Noda would even become Prime Minister. However, the Noda administration was in power for twice as long as the Hatoyama administration, because it was highly regarded by U.S. Forces.
At the end of PART 1, I mentioned the promotion of elite bureaucrats who became members of the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee. Authentic top-level elite bureaucrats, including successive public prosecutor generals, have become members of the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee, which is the consortium of U.S. Forces and Japanese bureaucrats. This means that the Japanese bureaucracy has become integrated within the “behind-the-scenes” legal structure, and that this status has already continued for 60 years. As a result, elite bureaucrats disregard Japanese domestic laws.