【PART 3】 The Mystery of the Security Treaty Village (1): The Showa Emperor and the Constitution of Japan
【40】 Behind two closed doors
Following the encouragement of Kades (and of Whitney, who approved it), MacArthur decided to make a draft constitution in haste. Kades had become a supervisor after getting approval from MacArthur, so it is obvious that MacArthur would do what Kades wrote in the report.
On February 1, 1946, the exact same day that Kades submitted the report, Mainichi Shimbun published a “scoop” on a draft constitution made by the Japanese government (the Matsumoto Committee). General history books say GHQ read the article and, surprised by the conservative draft constitution by the Japanese, started to make their own draft constitution. (I thought so too when I produced a book about it 20 years ago.)
I assume it was not likely that the article of Mainichi Shimbun on February 1 was a scoop, considering the censorship of the press by GHQ at that time. But I can’t prove it since there is no supporting documentation. The draft printed in the newspaper was written by Toshiyoshi Miyazawa (whom I mentioned earlier as the advocate of the August Revolution Theory). His younger brother was a writer reporter for Mainichi Shimbun. In terms of the circumstantial evidence, therefore, my assumption is correct. Moreover, February 1 was the day when the research group of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission, mentioned earlier, left from Yokohama for America. So it was the very moment when a “door” to other countries closed.
What we should remember here is that members of GHQ were military personnel who had taken part in a four-year world war until just before. Given their history, constitutional reform (that is, the establishment of a democratic constitution) was positioned as the most important mission in the policy of the U.S. Occupation of Japan. Based on my experience of reading confidential documents regarding the practices of the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Forces during these past years of research, they behave completely logically when given the most important mission. They take action after devising a strategy for victory no matter what happens. They do so by collecting information about an enemy by all means and analyzing it to predict its next action.
I will discuss the UN Charter in detail in PART 4, but the U.S. was involved in intense intelligence operations including eavesdropping at the UN Conference on International Organization (April – June 1945), at which the UN Charter was ratified. It is impossible that drafting the constitution, the most important project of the Occupation of Japan, which took more than one week with 25 members, began with GHQ’s surprise at coming upon an article in the Japanese newspaper.
It is also unlikely that they did not know the contents of the draft constitution made by the Japanese government by then. As I will show later, their time schedule from the date of drafting the constitution to the date of the Japanese government’s acceptance was clearly decided. It may be easier to understand if it is considered as a kind of military operation.