【PART 5】  The Last Mystery Voluntary slavish obedience and its historical origin


【10】 “If the U.S. is defeated in Korea, all of us would probably be put to death.”


Some of the Emperor’s aides, including Yasumasa Matsudaira, lodged near the Imperial villa in Hayama for a few days, along with Pakenham, to discuss how to document the verbal message. A remark by one of the Emperor’s aides has been revealed in an American document (the “Dulles document”). He is reported to have said: “If the U.S. is defeated in Korea, all of us would probably be put to death,” while tapping at his neck to imply a beheading (Five Decisions of Emperor Hirohito).

This means, first, that the Showa Emperor and high-class aristocrats were seriously afraid that their heads would roll in the case of a communist revolution. But second, that this fate included Japan’s ruling class as a whole. Such was the fear of communism from the very beginning of the Security Treaty Vilage.

The Emperor felt that such a move would meet with widespread approval among the Japanese people who fear not only the menace of Russia, but after the Occupation has ended, … an ‘incident’ which Russia could use as a basis for interfering internally in Japan.

The “Japanese citizens” afraid that the Soviet Union would cause an incident are, of course, not the general public but the ruling class afraid of being executed. They were afraid that the Soviet Union would have the Japanese communists cause a revolt, uproot the regime in one go, and then behead all of them.

Such fear of a communist revolution, which began during the war and persisted afterwards, was one reason for requesting the U.S. Forces to stay stationed in Okinawa and the mainland. Article 9-2 of the Constitution, which stipulated the renunciation of war potential, was another. This was clearly not a personal decision on the Showa Emperor’s part, but a consensus among Japan’s ruling party.

Upon receiving the message from the Showa Emperor, Dulles is said to have been delighted, saying this was the biggest achievement in his visit to Japan. Following the documentation of the message, Dulles drafted the (former) Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in February 1951. In the preamble, it said:

Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement for its defense, that the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan . . .

In other words, it stated that the U.S.Forces’ stationing was only because Japan requested it. I believe this is the main reason that enemy state clauses (UN Charter Articles 53 and 107) are still applied to Japan.

In negotiations for treaties and agreements, negotiators exert their skills in slipping exclusion clauses into the text, clauses which consider special cases in addition to setting the basic policies and articles. Such exemptions deviate from the overall rules of the treaty, so the key here is to create an appearance that “the other party asked for this.” But once that condition was established in negotiations with Japan, it was a piece of cake for Dulles, an expert on international law who was deeply involved in establishing the UN Charter, to “legitimize” any absurd situation.(*)

As you can see in the Secret Report mentioned on PART 2, U.S. Forces still have the legal right to create military bases in any place in Japan. They can fly as low as they want, and move their troops without notification in advance. There is nothing more outrageous.

I’ve explained how such an outrageous situation can only be possible because of the application of the UN Charter’s “enemy state clauses” to Japan. However, even if that is the logical structure under international law, the fundamental cause is that the U.S. Forces’ stationing was requested from the Japanese side, or more specifically, from the Showa Emperor as a consensus of the ruling class.


* ・・・ The military’s original plan to turn Okinawa into a “strategic trust territory of the United Nations” (mentioned earlier) was scrapped when it became certain that the Soviet Union would veto the plan in the U.N. Security Council. Devised in its place by John Foster Durres was the idea of “playing tricks with Article 3 of the peace treaty” (see PART 4).
The idea of the “transitional administrative rights” over Okinawa that was built into the peace treaty’s Article 3 obviously originated from the U.N. Charter’s provisions concerning transitional security arrangements, including Article 53, also known as the enemy state clause, which provides that “…until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression [by the enemy state],” Article 106 (the prerequisite for the provision of Article 107), which provides that “[p]ending the coming into force of [the United Nations forces] …”, and Article 51 on the right of collective self-defense which provides that “…until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” Thus by stretching interpretation of the concept of “transitional security arrangements” inherent in the U.N. Charter, and by perpetuating its effect, Dulles’s legal trick made it possible for the U.S. to place Okinawa and the whole of Japan under its military occupation, and also to transform itself from a democratic state into a military base empire.