Japan tied up by the “Zendo-Kichi formula”
Y: The justification of the committee’s meetings is Article 1 of the former Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which said “Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan.”
Y: This is the root of Japan’s warped condition. It is not about the disposition of bases.
There were huge U.S. bases in the Philippines, but the military bases agreement between the U.S. and the Philippines specified all the names of the bases, such as Clark. In our agreements, however, the names of the bases aren’t stated.
H：So there’s no restriction.
Y: And the U.S. has the right to dispose. It is called the Zendo-Kichi formula (or the formula that the entire area of Japan must be regarded as a potential base). Also, “in and about” Japan means they can come and go cross the border freely. The committee was created to manage this agreement, which is a special privilege that U.S. Forces secured through victory in WW2.
The Department of State strongly opposed such a special privilege right after the war, but the military authorities have preserved it. Bureaucrats have followed this system according to the way the committee was set up, and the Public Prosecutor General came to be put in control.
T：In sum, U.S. Forces occupied Japan after the war. But in 1952 Japan became independent by virtue, ostensibly, of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The U.S. didn’t want to pull out, however, because of the Cold War.
So the former Security Treaty stipulates U.S. privileges in Article 1, an Administrative Agreement, or the later Status of Forces Agreement. And the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee exists to manage these. That is how it is structured.
Y: I was able to write confidently about this matter because of the existence of an official U.S. document.
Y: It is a report on U.S. bases around the world at the time President Eisenhower was reelected. It was written for the Department of State from the U.S. Embassy to Japan. So it is absolutely authoritative. The former Security Treaty became effective in 1951, and this report was written in February of 1957. It is very important in seven ways.
First, regarding the Administrative Agreement which regulates U.S. Forces, the report states that the Agreement “preserves for the U.S. a large degree of the autonomy and independence in the conduct of its military activities which it had during the occupation.”
T： Remarkable. It is stated so directly.
Y: It declares that, since the withdrawal of GHQ, the U.S. cannot make demands on the Japanese government, yet the U.S. has still maintained its military forces.
Second, the report says that “under the Security Treaty our forces may be used without consultation of any kind with the Japanese Government.”
This is why the Osprey, which is a highly defective and accident-prone military aircraft, is deployed in Japan. The Noda administration said that “we cannot say anything” about the deployment of the Osprey even if it endangers Japanese people. It was a very honest statement, considering the prior and ongoing existence of the Administrative Agreement.
Third, “under the Administrative Agreement, the right to decide upon new base requirements and retain existing bases has been left to U.S. military judgment.”
This explains the planned construction of the Henoko base. People in Okinawa know this, so ultimately they think they have to devote themselves to stopping it. If they trust their government to prevent construction of the base, sooner or later the construction will happen. Fourth, the report says that “there are a host of subsidiary agreements impinging on local sovereignty and interests.”
It is absurd to think we had reached an agreement to have sovereignty violated.
T：They are impinging.
Y: They protect an ecosystem of bats but impinge on Japanese sovereignty and interests.
Fifth, it says “uncounted agents of numerous American intelligence and counterintelligence agencies operate unhindered throughout Japan.”
H：They are spying.
Y: Many say that CIA officials in Japan don’t come through Narita or Haneda. As Mr. Hatoyama said, American bodyguards bring guns.
H：Yes. They have guns from the beginning. When I went to the U.S. as Prime Minister, my bodyguards were all unarmed. They couldn’t have guns.
Y: I’m sure they don’t come through Haneda or Narita.
H： Through other entrances.
Y: Sixth, “American military units, eqiupment, dependents, etc., also are authorized to move freely to and from Japan without any local agreement and without even advance information to the local authorities.”
This is about the airspace above the Yokota base, which I mentioned.
Y: Seventh, “within Japan, maneuvers are held, firing practice conducted, planes flown, and other vital day-to-day military activities take place–all at the determination of U.S. officials.” which is related to the second point.
How much they exercise these rights depends on political situations and the degree of protests in Japan. Nevertheless, we have to think out a strategy. The root of it is this.
T：The former Security Treaty Article 1.
Y: It is not [about] lending military bases, but the right of disposition of military forces in and about Japan. The present Japan-U.S. Security Treaty has been reworded, but because of the secret agreement it is essentially unchanged. The most important thing in the secret agreement is this:
Y: In 1960, right before the revision of the Security Treaty, the agreement was signed by Fujiyama, Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Kishi administration, and MacArthur, the U.S. ambassador to Japan. So U.S. rights in USFJ have not been changed since 1952, when the former Security Treaty was signed.
T：The last part, “have not been changed,” is the point.
Y: (1) is about facilities and areas and the status of U.S. armed forces in Japan. (2) is the “status of forces agreement” under the new Security Treaty. (3) is the Administrative Agreement under the former Security Treaty.
So all the important centers of Japanese administration, such as 1) the Supreme Court, 2) the prosecutors’ office and 3) MOFA, have secret instruction manuals because of these agreements that cannot be shown to the people.
Y:Mr. Maedomari has “gotten the scoop” on 3) “How to Interpret Japan-U.S. SOFA”; and Mr. Shoji Niihara, a researcher from the Red Flag, and Mr. Toshihiro Yoshida know the most about 1) and 2).
The Japan-U.S. Joint Committee is closed to the public, so we don’t really know about it. But we can guess what they are discussing from these three manuals resulting from the meetings of the committee.
H：Documents about the committee must exist somewhere. Can’t we obtain access to them?
Y: They only disclose part of their information, but even that is quite astonishing.
T：There is a single [geopolitical] structure that includes the treaty, the agreement, the committee, and the records—secret or not. This structure is what we hadn’t been able to see.